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Abstract 
In October 2005, the EU has formally started accession talks with Turkey 
whilst indicating that the progress of negotiations is dependent on the 
advancement of pro-democracy reforms in the country.  The Turkish military 
defies this call in favour of its heavy influence in politics which is consolidated 
since September 11 for bordering the oil-rich nations of Muslim and Turkic 
‘brothers’ as a NATO ally. However, the army’s strong position in the domestic 
setting is largely maintained by the historical and structural challenges of neo-
liberal policies in Turkey to the economic foundations of democracy. In order 
to implement a neo-liberal programme dating back to the 1970s, an uneasy 
but considerable democratisation process was replaced with what is called in 
this paper ‘institutional oppression’ led by the military. Since then, the 
fundamental promise of the official rhetoric of ‘catching the level of 
contemporary civilisations’ has lost its direction in political terms. At the 
expense of democratic ideals, institutional oppression sustains one of the 
world’s largest ‘emerging market’ economies in Turkey and, not least for this 
reason, appeals to the hegemonic powers of globalisation as a ‘role model of 
democracy’ to be promoted in all Muslim and Turkic countries. Bearing all 
these issues in mind, the present study is devoted to a historical analysis of 
institutional oppression and its relation to the neo-liberal project in Turkey. 
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Introduction 
During imperial times, caliphate sultans had long obstructed the emergence of 
a strong bourgeois class and democracy by forbidding land ownership and 
commerce to Muslims who comprised the major component of their subjects.1 
Although Mustafa Kemal proclaimed a secular Republic at the end of the 
Great War, he also became bogged down in monopolising the reins of power 
through the single-party rule of the Republican Populist Party (RPP) until his 
death at the outset of World War II. The rival Democrat Party (DP) ascended 
to office after the 1950 elections and acquired the mandate to govern once 
more in 1955 by generous subsidies to its rural grassroots.2 The ‘irrational’ 
use of national resources was heralded as ‘a legitimate ground’ by the army 
for its 1960 intervention with the support of pro-industrialist and ‘from-above’ 
modernist leftists gathered under the umbrella of the RPP.3 Elections were 
staged in 1963, but civil politics were again interrupted by the 1971 
pronunciamento, overthrowing a slightly moderate descendant of the DP from 
office. Despite the objections of RPP cadres, the military also arrested 
sympathisers of a so-called ‘National Democratic Revolution’ (NDR) that 
sought to promote an ‘anti-imperialist Kemalism’.4 The NDR’s supporters, 
especially those in bureaucratic positions, were not ‘compatible’ with a 
‘technocrat cabinet’ assigned by the military until the 1973 elections in order 
to make structural adjustments to the economy for the implementation of the 
                                                
1Halil Inalcik, Osmanli Para ve Ekonomi Tarihine Toplu Bir Bakis, 2001, Dogu Bati, 4(17), pp.9-42. 
2Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace, A Wider European Community?, A Federal Trust Paper, 1976, p.36. 
3Berch Berberoglu, ‘Turkey: the crisis of the neo-colonial system’, Race and Class, 1981, vol.XXXII, no.3, 1981, 
pp.277-291. 
4 Ahmed Samim, ‘The Tragedy of the Left’, NLR 126, March-April 1981, pp. 60-85. The army also made an ill-
concealed use of far right thugs, costing up to 300 lives by the time of the 1971 coup. Emre Kongar, Turkiyenin 
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low tariff prescriptions of the OECD.5 Students of the NDR doctrine argued 
that reductions in trade quotas would undermine the independence of 
industrial development.6 Noticeably, imports had increased from a 7 per cent 
annual average of GDP in the 1960s to 14 per cent in 1978, the year that saw 
an initial acceptance of a neo-liberal programme. Intermediate goods were 
responsible for 90 per cent of this rise, forging ahead a ‘montage industry’.7 
Nevertheless, both the 1960 and 1971 military interregnums lent themselves 
to greater recognition of civil institutions in Turkey. In return for leftist 
intellectuals’ support of the 1960 coup, the army introduced a relatively 
democratic constitution in 1961.8 Labour was given the prerogative to become 
organised and to strike. In 1963, the first trade union confederation came on 
the scene. Concessions to labour were also in line with a growing need for 
‘effective demand’ due to industrialisation, although it increasingly became a 
‘montage industry’ in the 1970s.9 Yet this shift gave an impetus to industry. 
Between 1960 and 1970, the share of industry in GDP went up from 15 per 
cent to 18 per cent, reaching over one-quarter in 1978.10 Disillusioned by the 
1971 coup, intellectuals had also begun to distance themselves from the army 
and made approaches to a rapidly growing working class: The ratio of 
industrial and service sector jobs to the working age population had increased 
from 19 per cent in 1960 to 22 per cent in 1970 and further increased to 30 
                                                                                                                                         
Toplumsal Yapisi, Remzi Kitabevi: Istanbul 1985, Vol. 2, p. 567. We will return to the utilisation of far right 
paramilitaries by the army later as a widening strategy both during and after the transition period to neo-liberalism. 
5 OECD, Country Report: Turkey, Paris 1970. 
6 Dogan Avcioglu, Turkiye’nin Duzeni, Bilgi Yayinevi: Ankara 1973, pp.125-127. 
7 SIS (State Institution of Statistics), The Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1979, p.125. 
8 Bulent Ecevit, ‘Labour In Turkey As a New Political Force’, in Kemal Karpat, Social Change and Politics in 
Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis, ed., Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973, pp151-181 
9 Caglar Keyder, ‘The political economy of the Turkish democracy’, NLR 115, May-June 1979, pp.3-44. 
10 SIS 1999, p.33. 
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per cent in 1978.11 Under the leadership of intellectuals in the 1970s, a left 
wing trade union confederation, DISK was formed as a counterweight to the 
Association of Businessmen, TUSIAD. Union density had risen to 27 per cent 
in 1978 from 2 per cent in 1960. In the same period, the average of real 
wages surged by half, and the share of bottom quintile in national income 
doubled to 5.7 per cent.12 When these occurrences are considered along with 
the abandonment of totalitarian monarchism for a republican and secular state 
and then the introduction of multi-party elections, it would be fair to refer to a 
democratisation process in Turkey from the end of the Great War to the 
1970s, albeit not an easy one. Such a process, however, was encroached 
upon by institutional oppression in conjunction with the introduction of neo-
liberalism. 
To analyse institutional oppression in this study, its major aspects will be 
considered in a systematic manner. It will first be shown that the oppressive 
regime gained a distinctive character in the neo-liberal era. As we shall see, 
the resistance of labour and protectionist capital was suppressed through a 
bloody transitional period to neo-liberalism, resulting in the military coup of 
1980. Then, in order to secure the implementation of the neo-liberal project, 
the military regime’s presence was rooted into various institutions. 
Challenging the interests of the working class, the regime crushed democratic 
opposition, yet devised its mouthpieces and rigged elections that also 
provided a specific premise for the emasculation of protectionism. Focusing 
                                                
11 Labour force figures used in this study have been standardised by the OECD, and include ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ employment. OECD, Labour Force Statistics, Paris 1975, 2000. 
 6
on another characteristic of institutional oppression in Turkey, the paper will 
subsequently highlight the regime’s opportunistic approach to ethnic and 
religious spectrums, respectively. It will be asserted that, whilst promoting 
neo-liberal capital accumulation within ethnic and religious spheres, the army 
paved the way for the Kurdish upheaval, far right jingoism, Mafia/corrupt civil 
politicians and pro-Islamic tides. Ironically, such developments cast the 
military in the role of the ‘final resort’ for many within the elite and public who 
came to view it as the only instrument that could hold the country together. 
The last part of the study, however, will argue that a sustainable future for the 
country depends on smarter responses by the democratic opposition to 
institutional oppression. 
A Bloody Transition to Neo-Liberalism 
Leading Western countries, such as the US and UK, liberalised capital 
transactions in the early 1970s and fully left money standardisation with gold. 
Thus, they terminated the basic principles of the international monetary 
settlement of the post-war period, known as the Bretton Woods System. The 
departure from existing conventions ignited expansion in stock capitals, 
finance sectors and ‘capital migrations’. However, it also challenged 
democracy in the world.13 As Chomsky commented: 
                                                                                                                                         
12 To give an idea of the national income in general, it is useful to note that GDP grew from $33bn in 1960 to 
$91bn in 1978. (All values given in this study are based on the 1990 real prices and exchange rates). Turkiye’nin 
Toplumsal Yapisi, Table X-7, p.468, World Bank, World Tables, OUP: Oxford 1985. 
13A specific account of ‘seigniorage’ regarding its implications for Western economies and globalisation is 
provided by Riccardo Parnobi, ‘The Dollar Standard’, in Jeffrey A Frieden and David A. Lake, International 
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, St. Martin’s Press, Inc.New York, 1987, pp.285-
297. 
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Liberalising the movements of capital worldwide since the Bretton 
Woods system, essentially dismantled from the early 1970s, has 
proved a powerful weapon against democracy.14 
Under the global conditions of the early 1970s, Turkey was one of the ideal 
locations in the world for the initiation of export substitution policies and 
capital outflows as the socialist block restricted alternative options. OECD 
remedies for the Turkish economy were adjusted toward foreign capital 
liberalisation.15 However, as indicated earlier, Turkish industrialists had just 
committed themselves to the ‘montage industry’ through the increased 
imports of intermediate goods at the beginning of the 1970s. Large capital 
holders were against the sudden shift of the West to neo-liberalism, since the 
prospect of competition with foreign investors threatened the ownership of 
companies by domestic entrepreneurs, which had been safeguarded through 
the protectionist regulations of the government up until then.16 An anti-
Western stance became popular when Turkey occupied Cyprus in 1974, after 
a military junta in Greece had attempted to annex the island. Prime Minister 
Ecevit rejected any negotiation with the West and the junior partner in his 
coalition government, the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party, publicly 
declared the ‘Christian World’ an enemy. 
To create a reconciliatory climate in Turkey, the World Bank announced in 
1975 that the Turkish economy was on the verge of ‘defaulting’. The 
establishment was not impressed by this call as the country was actually 
                                                
14 Noam Chomsky, ‘Finance and Silence’, Le Monde Diplomatique, 1 January 1999. 
15 OECD, Country Report: Turkey, 1973. 
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enjoying a buoyant economy, with no less than a 7 per cent surge in that 
year.17 Then, citing the occupation of Cyprus, the US Administration enacted 
a military embargo on Turkey in 1976. However, recent studies have 
underpinned Ecevit’s long-standing claim that America’s aim was to 
pressurise for neo-liberal policies rather than avert ‘Turkey’s invasion against 
the British influence on the island’.18 Defying the ‘embargo diplomacy’, 
succeeding Prime Minister Demirel intensified ‘friendly relations’ with the 
USSR to obtain financial credits. Instant grants, especially for the Iron and 
Steel Industry, greatly contributed to a 10 per cent economic growth in 1976. 
This preceded the freezing of cheque payments to Turkey by Western banks 
and GDP subsequently slowed down by two-thirds in 1977.19 A workers’ 
protest on May Day ended in the loss of forty lives, since far right militants of 
the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) had opened fire on demonstrators. 
Notably, the army, together with international arms smugglers, had supplied 
weaponry to the NMP’s mobs as ‘sons of the nation against communism’ in 
order to end the military embargo by coercing civil politicians to accept the 
neo-liberal doctrine.20 The deployment of NMP militants was carried out 
through the ‘Special Warfare Division’ (SWD) originally set up by the Nixon 
Administration in cooperation with the NMP as a ‘back up plan against the 
expansionist ambitions of USSR towards the South’.21 After staging the 
                                                                                                                                         
16 Korkut Boratav and Erinc Yeldan, Turkey - 1980-2000: Financial Liberalisation, Macroeconomic 
(In)Stabilisation, and Patterns of Distribution, Working Paper, No.25, Bilkent University: Ankara, 2001, p.6. 
17 Fikret Baskaya, Paradigmanin Iflasi, 1991, Doz Yayinlari, Istanbul, p.71 
18 See, for example, Dennis Sewell, ‘Divide and Rule in Peace’, New Statesmen, 1996, August 23, p.32; Brendan 
O’Malley, and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, I. B. Tauris & 
Company: New York 2000, pp.57-63. 
19 SIS, 1978. 
20 Turkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapisi, p.543. 
21 Desmond Fernandes & Iskender Ozden, ‘United States and Nato Inspired Psychological Warfare Operations’, 
Variant, Volume 2, No 12, Spring 2001, p.11. 
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embargo, Congress banned American armaments to the SWD as well. In 
response, the Turkish government decided to dismantle the SWD but the 
army did not allow this and continuously guarded paramilitary groups to 
combat the ‘enemies from inside’.22 
As killings soared to 1,200 in 1978, the government agreed with the IMF on a 
programme for ‘export-substituted development’ and the embargo was lifted 
before the army declared marshal law nationwide. The chief executive of 
Lockheed, a US-based arms maker, was also arrested for arms smuggling, 
even though investigations into the issue were shelved after the assassination 
of journalist Abdi Ipekci, who was leading research into illegal activities in the 
guns’ and ammunitions’ market.23. The government started lobbying in the 
parliament to lift constitutional restrictions on the liberalisation of financial and 
commodity markets, but it soon became clear that the majority of MPs were 
not prepared to endorse neo-liberal reforms due to fears of losing their 
electoral support from labour and financial support from the protection-leaning 
businessmen.  
To raise the army’s appetite for neo-liberalism, on the other hand, the Carter 
Administration encouraged the military to develop its own ‘private business’ in 
the cargo industry through IMF credits, and, in 1978, the army set up one of 
the largest export fleets in Turkey, OMSAN.24 Although the chief of staff, 
Semih Sancar, rejected ‘junta conspiracies’, America’s financial incentives 
                                                
22 ‘United States and Nato Inspired Psychological Warfare Operations’, p.12. 
23Ercument Isleyen, ‘Ipekci’de Susurluk Imzasi’, Milliyet, February 1999. 
24The financial assistance for OMSAN was provided under a special programme of ‘Economic and Military Co-
operation with Turkey’ which guaranteed $375m in 1978, in addition to $3bn for 1979, and $3.5bn for 1980. 
International Monetary Fund, IMF Surveys, 8 May 1978 p.142; 6 November 1978 p.351; 21 April 1980 p.126. 
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created splits in the military command chain, and subsequently he went into 
early retirement. The position was filled by a ‘surprise’ name, General Kenan 
Evren. According to conventional practices in the army, he was expected to 
retire after completing his last assignment in the Aegean sub-army, but his 
‘prestige in the Pentagon’ was heralded by pro-American journalists as an 
invaluable asset for the job.25 
The weakness of the government became evident in its failure to announce a 
neo-liberal package until 1980 with a set of cabinet decisions. Yet 
constitutional restrictions on the liberalisation of markets and foreign 
investments were still remaining, and it was becoming increasingly formidable 
to eliminate them for the implementation of neo-liberal programmes. As the 
austerity prescriptions of the IMF triggered declines in wages and fomented 
strikes across the country, the resistance of MPs to the approval of neo-liberal 
reforms at the expense of the electorate became greater.26 Meanwhile, the 
attacks of far right militants against workers culminated in a total of 5,000 
murders. Most politicians complained that, although the embargo had been 
lifted and marshal law had been introduced, the army had not acted quickly 
enough to assist the government’s attempts to halt the bloodshed.27 In 
September 1980, Kenan Evren together with his four fellow commanders, 
seized power as the ‘saviours’ of the country, and President Carter expressed 
his joy by saying that ‘our boys finished the job’ when he heard the news.28 
The neo-liberal media in the West, such as The Economist, acclaimed the 
                                                
25 Cuneyt Arcayurek, Buyuklere Masallar, Kucuklere Gercekler 1: Demokrasi Donemecinde Uc Adam, Bilgi 
Yayinevi: Ankara 2000, p.201. 
26 Tuncer Bulutay, Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey, ILO/SIS: Ankara 1995, p.306. 
27 Demirtas Ceyhun, Biz Karabiyikli Turkler, Gundogan Yayinlari, Ankara, 1991, p.134 
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coup as ‘a forward step for democracy’, although the junta suspended all 
political parties, trade unions and civil society organisations.29 Many members 
of parliament, including Prime Minister Demirel, were arrested. He accused 
the West of ‘reserving democracy for their people, at the cost of ours’.30 What 
follows will show how an oppressive regime was institutionalised by the 
military in order to ensure the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. 
Institutional Oppression 
Since 1980, Turkey has continuously opened its economy to the world. For 
the proponents of neo-liberalism, the results of economic reforms have been 
pleasing. GDP has grown from $97bn to $336bn between 1980 and 2005.31 
The ratio of international trade had also climbed to over one-third of GDP up 
until Turkey joined the European Customs Union in 1995, and to half of it in 
1998, from a 12 per cent annual average in the 1960s and 1970s. By 2005, 
there was no substantial change in the ratio of trade to the economy. 
Following the liberalisation of foreign investments, annual capital inflow rose 
from $97 million in 1980 to $3bn in 1998.32 An important breakthrough in 
foreign investment was observed in 2005 when it rose to $10 mostly because 
of the start of accession talks with the EU. The neo-liberal reform project 
mapped out a privatisation programme as well; roughly $20bn in revenue 
                                                                                                                                         
28 M. Ali Birand ’12 Eylul Belgeseli’, Show TV, 1997, Episode 3. 
29 The Economist, Third Time Lucky, 1980, September 20, p.15. 
30 Cuneyt Arcayurek, Buyuklere Masallar … p.207. 
31 US Department of State (1998) Country Report on Economic Policy and Trade Practices: Turkey, US 
Department of State, Washington. OECD, National Accounts, Paris, 2001 & 2006. 
32 During this period, the surge in foreign capital mostly came from foreign investments in government debt 
securities rather than foreign direct investment in industry (FDI). In 1998, for example, a $805 million FDI was 
accompanied by $2,300 million foreign investments in government debt securities. IMF, Financial Statistics, 
1999, Geneva, p.123. 
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proceeded from sales between 1986 and 2000.33 A sluggish proceeding of 
privatisation operations in succeeding years has also been intercepted in 
2005 with a record level of $10bn.34  
After the establishment of neo-liberalism in the country, however, the previous 
coupling of democratisation with economic development derailed. In this 
sense, the case of Turkey lends much support to MacEwan’s postulation that: 
Neo-liberalism prevents the implementation of programmes that 
would allow people to exercise political control over their economic 
affairs, involve people in solving their own economic problems, and 
serve the material needs of the great majority.35 
Once the military came to power, it abolished the relatively democratic 
constitution of 1961 and introduced a number of laws that ‘deregulated’ 
financial and commodity markets. To give the economy an outward-
orientation, the military also assigned IMF-favoured Turgut Ozal and his 
cadres to the Ministry of the Economy. Ozal stipulated all necessary economic 
reforms, and the State Planning Organisation started to implement them. 
Because of a growing public pressure in Europe, however, Brussels froze 
economic relations with Turkey in 1982 for the retrieval of elections. The 
military permitted elections in the following year, but before that, it had 
secured a victory to Ozal’s newly established Mother Land Party (MLP). To 
parachute the neo-liberal MLP to office, the military barred the Justice Party 
                                                
33 In 2000, acquired revenues from privatisation were around one-third of the total income expected from all sales. 
PPF, Public Participation Fund, Privatisation Report, PPF: Ankara 1998 and OECD, Revenue Statistics, Paris 2000 
& 2005 
34 OECD, Revenue Statistics, Paris 2005. 
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(JP) and the RPP from joining the race as the main parties of the centre since, 
unlike them, the neo-liberal MLP had no readily available capital or labour 
backing.36 Capitalising on proscriptive practices, the MLP took office in 1983. 
Later, in support of Turkey’s first formal application for EU membership in 
1986, JP and RPP cadres were allowed, via a referendum, to participate in 
contests, yet the MLP again emerged as the ‘victorious’ party in the 1987 
elections. This second victory of the MLP was also implanted in a military 
constitution introduced in 1982. The constitution enabled party leaders to 
choose top candidates to run in any region and, in doing so, instigated what 
critics dubbed ‘the reincarnation of monarchy by turning elections into an 
assignment system’.37 Through the use of lavish loans public funds in the first 
term of power, Turgut Ozal created sponsor-candidates for his party and 
engaged in luxury campaigns. The introduction of a new ‘hidden-budget’ law, 
in particular, helped Ozal to cover up his corrupt ‘subsidies’ to neo-liberal 
entrepreneurs for ‘imaginary exports’ on fake documents.38 
Whilst gaining political power, Ozal wanted to distance himself from the 
military in order to develop a ‘democratic image’ before the electorate, 
especially in his second term. Most notably, he tried to privatise what the army 
regarded as ‘militarily sensitive companies’ such as those in the Machinery 
and Chemical Industry (MKK) and the Military Electronic Industry (ASELSAN). 
From the army’s point of view, however, the strategic importance of Turkey 
had become even greater after the Cold War, and therefore, ‘militarily 
                                                                                                                                         
35 Arthur MacEwan, Neo-Liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets and Alternatives for the 21st 
Century, Zed Books: 1999, p.5. 
36Sevket Pamuk, ‘Anavatanin Sermaye Tabani’, Onbirinci Tez, 1986, 5(23), pp.72-97. 
37 ODP (Freedom and Solidarity Party), Party Programme, 2002, p.12. 
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sensitive’ companies could not be privatised, but more resources had to be 
allocated for military purposes. No company in these industries was sold and 
the country’s defence spending became one of the largest budgets in the 
World, increasing to the current 7 per cent level of GDP in 2005 from a 3% 
annual average in the second half of the 1970s.39 In this ‘success’ of the 
military, the growing geo-political importance of the army for the USA had 
played an important role. To reinforce the southern flank of NATO, the US 
wanted the army to become modernised. For this purpose, the US also urged 
Turkey in 1996 to initiate a $150bn-worth military renovation programme. It is 
not known what proportion of the money was extracted from the ‘hidden 
budget’ of the government.40 However, geo-political accounts were no end to 
the story.  
In the domestic setting, a powerful military was crucial to secure the continuity 
of neo-liberal project against the ‘resistance’ of civil politicians. Civil politics 
had a potential for pragmatist aberrations from ‘economic openness’ in order 
to ‘mend fences’ with the well-established protectionist capital before the neo-
liberal project. To reduce the influence of protection-leaning investors on 
parties, the military set up various barriers. Most notably, whilst the abolition 
of the public scrutiny on the financial sources of political parties created 
corrupt sources for the neo-liberal MLP, it became difficult for these investors 
to maintain a decisive influence on major political parties. In an attempt to 
augment parties’ chances of winning elections, all party leaders began to 
                                                                                                                                         
38Ugur Mumcu, ‘Belegeriyle Hayali Ihracatcilik’, 1985, Cumhuriyet, June 25. 
39 Gungor Aras, ‘Askeri Harcamada Dunya Birincisiyiz’, Milliyet, 28 March 2002; OECD, Revenue Statistics, 
Paris 2006 
40 Perihan Cakiroglu, ‘Dunyaya Silah Satan Turkiye’, Milliyet, 7 April 1997. 
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appoint sponsor candidates, not only from among corrupt businessmen, but 
also from drug barons who thrived in the milieu of army-led neo-liberal 
policies, as will be discussed later. The influence of protectionist businesses 
was also limited on small parties, whose number had increased to dozens 
after the mid-1980s by operating as political extensions of certain companies. 
Through the constitution, the army introduced a nationwide ten per cent 
threshold, and votes for smaller parties were thereby redistributed to the 
larger parties. Yet the ‘danger’ of protectionism was far from disappearing. 
Opposition to Turkey joining the European Customs Union in 1995, for 
example, was led by the second largest conglomerate of Turkey, Koc Holding, 
which declared the Union to be an ‘unfair competition mechanism against 
domestic producers’.41 
Nor was it inconceivable for civil politicians to compromise over the neo-liberal 
project in favour of electoral ‘populism’ toward a deeply frustrated working 
class. Pro-market policies in agriculture, such as the lifting of tariffs for imports 
and mechanisation for exports, have created millions of unemployed 
peasants. Privatisation, automation and new management strategies have 
also constrained employment prospects in urban areas.42 Even though the 
ratio of industrial and service sector jobs to the working age population (WAP) 
had gone up to 30 per cent in 1978, from 19 per cent in 1960, growth has 
stopped in the neo-liberal era –down to 27 per cent in 2004. Consequently, 
the total labour force had plunged to below half of the WAP in 2004, from 
                                                
41 Oral Calislar, ‘Basbakan Kim Olsun’, Cumhuriyet, 1995, December 29. 
42 Theo Nichols, Nadir Sugur, Erol Demir and Aytul Kasapoglu, ‘Privatisation in Turkey: Employees’ Views on 
Privatisation in the Turkish Cement Industry and Some Comparisons with Britain’, Work, Employment and 
Society, vol.12, no.1, 1998, pp.1-24. 
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three-quarters in 1978.43 By the end of the Nineties, the proportion of 
shantytown dwellers had already doubled to half of the total population in 
cities, and the share of the lowest fifth in national income had decreased by 
one-third.44 From 1978 to 2004, the real earnings of white collar and industrial 
workers had roughly slumped by two-thirds and one-third, respectively.45  
The benefits of pro-market labour policies, on the other hand, have been 
considerable, especially for export-oriented companies in the manufacturing 
industry and the military.46 Although the average annual growth rate in 
manufacturing output per employee had been no more than 3 per cent 
between 1960 and 1978, it was recorded as twice that by 2004.47 However, 
the military has become the biggest benefactor of neo-liberal policies in 
general. To ensure not only the political guardianship but also the ‘economic 
leadership’ of the army with respect to neo-liberal policies, Washington 
continuously deployed IMF credits in the service of the military for its various 
commercial activities. The Commerce Bureau of the US State Department 
has also kept providing the American Exim Bank with ‘special assurance 
letters’ to secure credits for such activities of the army that are free-from legal 
accountability and tax responsibilities.48  
                                                
43 OECD, Labour Force Statistics, Paris 1975, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005. A rise in the schooling ratio and annual 
growth rate of WAP has also contributed to the decline in the participation rate since 1980, but its impact has been 
residual. See, Surhan Cam, ‘Neo-Liberalism, Labour and Emerging Market Experience – Turkey’, 2002, Capital 
& Class, 77, pp.89-114. 
44 Altan Oymen, ‘Altakiler ve Usttekiler’, Milliyet, 3 November 1997. 
45 ILO, Bulletin of Labour Statistics - 1985, 1999, 2005, Geneva. 
46 Between 1980 and 2004, exports quadrupled to  65 per cent of manufacturing and 25 per cent of GDP. SIS 1986, 
2001, 2005. 
47 OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggregates, 1984, 2000, 2005, Paris vol.1. 
48 The US Department of State, Foreign Commercial Service, Country Commercial Guide: Turkey, The US 
Department of State, 2001 Washington, see pp.38 & 108. 
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Currently, the military owns the third largest company in Turkey, OYAK, which 
originated from a military pension fund.49 In the neo-liberal era, OYAK has 
become a conglomerate in the finance and manufacturing sectors. Since the 
very beginning of the privatisation programmes, it has taken over companies 
as a ‘private’ initiative. For instance, in the cement industry, the first privatised 
sector, OYAK owns half of nearly twenty companies. In time, it has also taken 
over companies in various industries from telecommunications to banks. In 
addition to OYAK, the army owns a sister company, the Foundation for 
Strengthening the Military, which is two-thirds the size of OYAK. The army 
also holds the largest shares in the ‘militarily sensitive’ industries of the MKK 
and ASELSAN. Altogether, the army emerges as the largest ‘commercial 
company’ in the economy and the largest of exporting companies as well as 
the largest buyer of privatised companies.50 Further, retired generals become 
permanent members on the managerial boards of export-oriented companies 
with inflated salaries. To secure the continuity of neo-liberalism under these 
circumstances, the army has institutionalised an oppressive regime in daily 
politics. 
A survey in 2002 suggested that three-quarters of parliamentarians 
considered the army, along with its ‘collaborators’ in the media, as the ruler of 
the country.51 For this, the army has equipped the National Security Council 
(NSC) with extensive powers. ‘Veteran’ generals hold key positions in the 
NSC, and report directly to the military. The NCS’s opinion on any issue is 
                                                
49 Taha Parla, ‘Merchantile Militarism in Turkey’, New Perspectives on Turkey, Fall 1998, No.19, pp.29-53. 
50 Milliyet, ‘Oyak Genel Muduru Nihat Ozdemir ile Bir Soylesi’ 2000, 3 July; Istanbul Sanayi Odasi, En Buyuk 
Besyuz Firma Listesi, http://bornova.ege.edu.tr/~muhkulup/sirketler/ilk_500.htm; Ihracatci Veri Bankasi, KOBI 
Veri Siteleri, http://www.igeme.org.tr/tur/kobi/kobi.asp 
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headlined in mainstream newspapers, the owners of which are usually kept 
satisfied by lavish loans.52 In general, the NSC operates as a preventative 
mechanism against the ‘dangers’ of democratic alternatives in political affairs. 
In the name of national security, for example, it continuously dismisses the 
objections of opposition parties to the legal unaccountability of ruling parties’ 
use of the ‘hidden-budget’. The election system was also given to the tutelage 
of the Supreme Court (SC), the Supreme Election Committee (SEC) and the 
State Security Court (SSC) that operate under military scrutiny in accordance 
with the 1982 constitution. The SC has so far turned down numerous electoral 
bills, including those designed by the cross-party alliances of backbenchers to 
increase intra-party democracy by reducing the power of party leaders. The 
SEC has arbitrarily banned hundreds of ‘untrustworthy’ candidates from 
standing in elections. The SSC has prosecuted dozens of elected MPs for 
joining political campaigns to protest the negative implications of neo-liberal 
policies for democracy and labour.53  
In particular, the army takes every possible precaution to protect neo-liberal 
policies against the working class. The military constitution has restricted 
strikes for blue-collar workers, excluded white-collar workers from 
unionisation, and increased the power of the cabinet to issue incessant 
decrees to stamp out legal strikes. Between 1978 and 2004, union density 
halved to 10 per cent because of the ‘liquidation’ of union activists by the 
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police and employers thanks to the military regulations.54 The Employment 
Code requires the military-led National Intelligence Organisation to inform 
employers about the ‘fingerprint history of militant workers’. In 2001, for 
example, nearly one quarter of the labour force was estimated to have been 
discriminated against in recruitment or subjected to unfair dismissals.55 Before 
leaving power ostentatiously in 1983, the army had already imprisoned 60,000 
‘traitors’, but since then disappearances and those reportedly committing 
suicide in detention centres have been countless.56 It is not possible to 
estimate the current number of political prisoners as official crime definitions 
are distorted, however, some statistics which became publicly available in 
2002 indicated that 149,000 people were ‘wanted’, whilst one-quarter were 
indicted with ‘offending the regime’.57 The violation of human rights and 
torture/ill-treatment across the country have become so common that in 
almost all annual reports of Amnesty International, Turkey is highly ranked 
among those nations suffering from repressive policies.58 
To constrain the political criticism of intellectuals, the army also brought in a 
military-led Higher Education Council (HEC). Since the early 1980s, it has 
sacked hundreds of scientists and stripped academics of titles for breaching 
HEC regulations. Notably, over one hundred academics-writers were awaiting 
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trial in 2002 for propagating anti-establishment ideas.59 Pressures on 
academic life have been stepped up in economic terms as well. In accordance 
with IMF prescriptions for ‘fiscal discipline’, pubic spending on education was 
halved to 2 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2004.60 Under-resourced and 
suffering from teaching overload, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
academics to contribute to, or stay in touch with, current knowledge. Instead, 
the regime produces its mouthpieces at universities. Most notably, these 
demagogues blame the poor not only for their own poverty but also for the 
country’s underdevelopment, alleging that they ‘pillage’ national resources by 
grabbing public sector jobs through patronage, and invading the lands of the 
state to construct shantytowns.61 The liberal media keeps a day-to-day record 
of such obfuscatory ‘inventions’. 
Because the dispersal of democratic ideologies is suppressed by the all-
pervading power of the military, the army maintains an ‘indisputable 
legitimacy’. The oppression of democratic currents assists the wider circles of 
society’s view of the military as a ‘most respectable institution’.62 However, 
such a ‘legitimacy’ based on the persecution of opposition is no proof of 
‘hegemonic consent’, since the latter is categorically based on convincing 
people of the legitimacy of authority.63 In this respect, the Turkish case is 
hardly idiosyncratic. Referring to a similar political phenomenon, observers 
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point out that the Molla Regime in Iran or Haydar/Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan, 
for instance, has some sort of ‘public support’.64 In Turkey, however, the 
prevalence of oppression in general necessitates a specific debate on its 
relation to neo-liberal economic policies within the context of ethnic and 
religious domains. Accordingly, we will now examine how the army’s attempts 
to promote neo-liberal capital accumulation within these domains have 
deepened, on the one hand, repression whilst paving the way for the Kurdish 
upheaval, far-right currents, corrupt/Mafia politicians and Islamic tides, yet, on 
the other, have lined up many behind the military against such developments. 
Ethno-Politics 
The Kurdish people are a core element within the ethno-politics of institutional 
oppression. The centuries-long independence struggle of the Kurds, who 
have never been totally subjugated, cannot be reduced simply to neo-liberal 
politics. However, this does not vindicate official propaganda depicting a 
bloody war against the Kurds since the initiation of neo-liberal economic 
policies as the inevitable price to pay to ‘crack down on separatist traitors’ for 
the sake of national unity. Even research commissioned by the international 
agencies of neo-liberalism, such as the IMF and World Bank, acknowledges 
the impact of economic conditions on civil wars in the World. In an influential 
report for the World Bank, for example, Collier and Hoeffler concluded: 
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Economic characteristics – dependence on primary commodity 
exports, low average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas – 
are all significant and powerful predictors of civil war.65 
In the mid-1950s and afterwards, the government developed several dam 
projects on the Euphrates and Tigris to generate electricity to the country and 
to irrigate lands in the densely Kurdish populated Southeast ‘for the socio-
economic assimilation of Kurds to the Turkish society by alleviating the 
uneven underdevelopment of the region’.66 Due to capital shortage, however, 
the construction process remained at a slow pace until the World Bank raised 
credits in the early 1980s as part of export promotion policies. In 2004, more 
than half of the total $30bn investment had been completed.67 Even so, the 
economic gap between the Southeast and the rest of the country has not 
narrowed but widened. The share of the region in gross national income 
roughly halved to 4 per cent between 1982 and 2004.68 In this period, official 
Kurdish policy also became increasingly oppressive; at least 35,000 Kurds 
were killed in a war which has also claimed the lives of 5,000 mostly 
conscripted soldiers garnered from poor families.69  
Neo-liberalism has undermined the economic conditions of the Kurdish people 
in respect of both animal husbandry and arable farming, which are the main 
occupations of the Kurds. Animal husbandry has been adversely affected; 
firstly, by the privatisation of the meat and animal food industries and then by 
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the removal of tariffs on meat imports. The sheep population, the dominant 
livestock in the Southeast as well as in Turkey, fell from 50 million in 1980 to 
28 million in 2004.70 In particular, although the irrigation project had raised 
cotton production in the region to more than half of the total across the 
country in 2004 from virtually nil in the early 1980s, the state continuously 
fixes very low official prices for the cotton in order to promote export-oriented 
textile companies.71 Farmers have become so impoverished that they cannot 
afford to pay their credit debts to the state.72 Moreover, the Kurdish people 
cannot benefit from new jobs in the export industries either, since investors 
tend to stay close to the main ports in the Western parts of the country rather 
than in the war-torn region.73  
The government has not been short of promises to promote the 
industrialisation of the region as a way of creating prosperity and peace for 
the Kurdish communities. In effect, however, it has consolidated the 
marginalisation of the Southeast by allocating rather low shares to the region 
from its incentives for export-oriented companies; in 2001, for example, the 
proportion was less than half per cent of the total.74 Further, in an attempt to 
prevent industrialisation through the evolution of feudal relations to capitalism 
in the Southeast, the State also forbade land trade for both small and large 
farmers. The NSC strictly keeps any sort of economic and entrepreneurial 
activities under control “as they risk accelerating the insurrections of the 
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Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) by creating either new sources for its 
‘protection racket businesses’ or an economically strong Kurdish elite 
favouring independence”.75 Nor is the establishment convinced that the 
emergence of an organised Kurdish working class in the Southeast would be 
less of threat than the existing peasantry communities to ‘the indivisible unity 
of the country’ once it encounters the severe implications of neo-liberal 
policies as happened in the Western regions.76 
The government has upheld the migration of impoverished Kurds from the 
Southeast as an official ‘solution’ to the social unrest in the region. For this 
purpose in particular, the state not only let down hundreds of thousands of 
families when their homes and lands were left under water by dams, but also 
introduced a policy of forced-migration accusing the people of ‘harbouring 
terrorists’. In general, over 3 million Kurds have been uprooted from 4000 
villages/hamlets since the early 1980s.77 However, instead of de-escalating 
the war, migration has expanded armed conflicts toward the Western cities, 
although they have started to lose momentum since the capture of Abdullah 
Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, in 1999. More recently, the government has 
decided ‘to take serious action’ to encourage agro-industrial sectors in the 
region. Nevertheless, the NSC largely limited investment opportunities to the 
American and Israeli entrepreneurs. By this strategy, the government hopes 
to gain the support of US-based lobbies against the international 
condemnation of oppressive policies toward the Kurds as the military steps up 
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attacks on those who try to go back to their villages after experiencing 
economic difficulties in the cities.78 
To persuade people that the war is not about the discontent of the Kurds but 
the ‘betrayal of a few secessionists’, the establishment reminds the public of 
the failure of a pro-Kurdish party, the HADEP (known by its Turkish initials) to 
pass the ten per cent national threshold in elections. As far as the official 
rhetoric is concerned, the HADEP’s failure to pass the threshold, despite 
Kurds making up 15 per cent of the total population, reflects the paucity of 
support for the HADEP from Kurds in the Western provinces due to their 
successful integration in society.79 However, the government forbids 
academic research to assess the accuracy of such a claim. The official view 
ignores, for example, the danger of growth in intimidation and killings, if the 
minority Kurds of Western constituencies enable the party to pass the national 
threshold without having local MPs in most cases.80 HADEP’s difficulty in 
entering parliament, however, demonstrates how nationalism is manipulated 
and marshalled behind the army. Since the closure of another pro-Kurdish 
party by the State Security Court of the military, after it gained several seats 
within a left-wing party in 1987, no party has embarked upon a similar alliance 
with the HADEP for fear of losing electoral support.81 
A far-reaching campaign against ‘imminent territorial disintegration’ has also 
fostered jingoism among the supporters of the far right NMP, and the military 
has made semi-official use of the NMP’s militant wing to terrorise Kurdish 
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villages. For this purpose, the army has formed ‘counter-guerrilla’ groups from 
NMP fanatics as well as ‘militia-forces’ from the tribes of local warlords, and 
shielded paramilitary organisations by extending military immunity to them.82 
However, it is not possible to fully understand the rise of the far right without 
taking drug trafficking into account. Whilst the war has led to a political 
‘vacuum’ in the South East, the army officers have deployed mobs of the NMP 
to utilise the region as an entrance route for heroin transfer from Asia to 
Europe.83 In addition to taxpayers’ money, a vast amount of income from the 
drugs trade has been diverted to the war effort, a total sum of $95bn.84 Yet, 
even such an amount is below the drug turnover ‘obtainable’ in less than two 
years; its annual scale is estimated to be $50bn.85 Around 80 per cent of 
heroin dispersed in European markets passes through Turkey.86  
The laundering of ‘dirty money’, initially carried out in various institutions 
ranging from universities to football clubs, has snowballed into ubiquitous 
corruption and spawned a generation of corrupt/Mafia politicians. Convicted 
political leaders of the Mafia, such as Mehmet Agar and Mustafa Bayram, 
were allowed to remain in parliament after symbolic fines.87 The NMP and the 
broader cohorts of corrupt politicians publicly hailed these criminals as 
‘patriots’, arguing that their investments, especially in the construction sector, 
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promote national interests by the export of construction materials and services 
to Asian countries.88 Apart from such euphemistic claims, one thing is certain, 
corrupt politicians continuously ‘legitimise’ the illegitimate in order to enable 
export companies to make ‘unfair profits’. In 1999, for example, the largest 
500 companies in the export-oriented manufacturing sector achieved eight-
fold more profits in the finance sector than in industrial production. In stock 
markets, companies plunder the small savings of people through false 
bankruptcies. Instead of taking legal action, the government strikes ‘fat loan’ 
deals with such companies to bail them out of ‘bankruptcy’.89 
Due to growing concerns about corruption, the public demands widespread 
transparency in political and economic affairs. As an expression of such 
demands, millions of protestors in 1998 condemned politicians by turning off 
the lights across the country for a period of time every night over two 
months.90 However, the military is not keen on risking any revelation about the 
individual wealth of generals, one of whom was ranked as ‘the richest soldier 
in the World’ according to a survey conducted by Time no more than three 
years after the 1980 coup.91 The army not only blockaded distribution of the 
magazine in that year but also the proceedings of most corruption-related 
cases in succeeding years. Since 1997, for example, civil hearings into what 
is publicly called the ‘Susurluk Case’ have not been concluded because it has 
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indicted some army officers with involvement in the drugs trade.92 The NSC 
repeatedly warns judges against ‘smearing the military by the misuse of legal 
freedoms’.93 Furthermore, when the army fails to prevent corruption reaching 
the headlines due to occasional fights among corrupt/Mafia gangs, the 
‘economic mechanisms’ of neo-liberalism kick in; once a political dispute 
erupts over corruption, international financiers run away. Notably, following a 
row between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer in 2001, $5bn fled the 
country over night, sparking off a currency crisis.94 Either by benefiting from 
such incidents or withholding legal inquiries, the military officers effectively 
disguise their illicit liaison with NMP-led drug smuggling operations from the 
populace, thereby acquiring specifically the reputation of being ‘the cleanest 
institution’, compared to ‘blatantly corrupt’ civil politics.95 
Partly because of a chauvinist sentiment fostered by the war against the 
Kurds and partly because of economic power supported by drug trafficking, 
the NMP has enjoyed an upsurge in the parliamentary spectrum. Although its 
electoral share had been no more than 6 per cent on average in the 1960s 
and 1970s, this proportion tripled in the 1999 elections through the injection of 
‘black money’ into a campaign which promised the party had reformed itself.96 
The liberal media argued that the ‘NMP was no longer the murderous gang of 
the late 1970s’.97 From this point of view, however, the slaughtering of Kurds 
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was perfectly ‘justified’ to maintain national unity. Instead of condemning the 
NMP for the killing of Kurds or its involvement in the drug trade, many ‘left-
wing’ columnists also hailed the party for its nationalistic Euro-scepticism 
amidst intensified talks over Turkey’s bid for membership of the EU.98 The 
pro-NMP campaign in general served for a new wave of neo-liberal policies. 
After the 1999 elections, it came to power as a coalition partner with the 
Democratic Left Party (DLP). Until then, opposition by stake holding 
bureaucrats, as well as workers, had prevented weak governments from 
completing the privatisation of public enterprises. 
Nor had the army intervened to help the government to overcome the 
opposition to privatisation, despite being the leading power behind the neo-
liberal project. The previously mentioned reservations of the army about the 
privatisation of ‘militarily sensitive’ companies played an important role in this. 
Further, the slow pace of privatisation gave the army, the largest buyer of 
public companies, the time to accumulate new capital to buy more companies. 
Nevertheless, soon after the NMP joined the coalition, the government 
doubled the extent of privatisation in 2000, although it had hitherto purported 
to ‘damn the selling out of national assets’.99 In particular, being the army’s 
collaborator in pursuing corrupt and jingoistic policies, the NMP threw its 
weight behind prioritisation of the military as a bidder in privatisation auctions. 
For example, in addition to some other companies, the largest chunk of the 
state banks was sold to OYAK through shady deals. The fraudulent nature of 
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tender offers also helps to explain why the so-called leftist DLP entered into a 
coalition with the NMP. In 2001, Husammettin Ozkan, a wealthy businessman 
and the state minister from the DLP, had been charged with ‘sleaze bidding’ 
but the coalition instantly ruled out the case.100 
Together with the DLP, the far right NMP lost office after the 2002 elections, 
yet its influence within the establishment remains. During the coalition 
government, the NMP supplemented the bulk of bureaucrats with its cadres 
who continue to enlarge their circle with further emplacements. Nurtured by 
the drug trade, they have grown into a ‘pan-Turkist clan’ in bureaucracy urging 
political unification with Turkic Republics in Central Asia.101 The wider strata of 
the political elite are not oblivious to the threat from far right currents, 
especially in respect of their high ranking jobs in the public sector. Even so, 
the elite eschew confrontations with the army over its part in the escalation of 
far right currents not only because they view the military as too strong to 
antagonise, but also because they believe that the far right emplacements can 
only be stopped by the army, and it will have to take action against them at 
some stage.102 The elite hold the view that the military inherently despises the 
rhetoric of brotherhood with Central Asian Turks since a decisive proportion of 
generals belongs to ethnically heterogeneous families which migrated from 
the Balkans after the Great War.103 Thus, the discontent of the elite with far 
right tides, as well as that of general public with the war in the Southeast, 
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boosts the perpetuation of institutional oppression by the military in effect, 
rather than presents a challenge to it. The next section will also show how the 
army has taken, on the one hand, advantage of Islamic currents by rallying 
them in the service of the neo-liberal project, yet, on the other, has appealed 
for public support to ‘guard secularism against fundamentalism’. 
Religion and Politics 
An understanding of the basic patterns of global policies toward Islamic tides 
can assist insight into the religion politics of institutional oppression in Turkey. 
Most notably, in the early 1980s, Osama bin Laden and the mujahedeen were 
supported by the United States in its efforts to drive the Soviets out of 
Afghanistan. After September 11, however, Washington commenced 
demonising anything that it could possibly associate with Islam as a way of 
shutting out ‘all enemies of America’. As Edward Said commented 
We are able to discriminate between terrorism of the sort that 
resulted in the World Trade Center bombing and what it is that the 
Palestinians are doing to fight the Israeli military occupation, but 
‘terrorism’ has now become synonymous with anti-Americanism.104 
Following the initiation of neo-liberal policies in the early 1980s, Islamic waves 
began to surge in the domestic realms of Turkish politics. Yet their chief 
advocate, the military, had no intention of sharing its material and political 
supremacy with the ‘clergymen of God’. In the late 1990s, the army started to 
highlight ‘the growing perils of religious currents’ with a populist demagogy 
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emphasising ‘the secular and republican regime of the people’. Such 
guardianship was not only against Islamic fundamentalism but also the 
economically deprived stratum of society because it specifically challenged 
the electoral pledges of pro-Islamic politicians ‘to promote social fairness 
unlike other parties’.105 
For a systematic analysis of the army’s relation to Islamic currents, we will first 
consider how the army actively encouraged such trends in the early 1980s 
and afterwards. To start with, an Islamic Trade Union Confederation, the 
HAK-IS has considerably grown under military tutelage. In addition to 
oppressive policies to debilitate trade unions, the army benefited from the 
HAK-IS championing the idea of an Islamic brotherhood with employers as 
opposed to conflict-oriented trade unionism.106 Although its share in total 
union membership was less than 7 per cent average in the late 1970s, this 
proportion had almost doubled by 1998.107 The HAK-IS’ expansion was partly 
due to the military allowing only this Confederation to operate in the 
workplaces of the army-owned enterprises. More importantly, it also reflected 
the army’s support for ‘Islamic companies’ where, too, only the HAK-IS was 
permitted to organise workers.108 
‘Islamic mercantilism’ at large was utilised by institutional oppression to serve 
the neo-liberal project. The early 1980s were a transitional period for the 
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export of products not yet ready to sell to developed countries, for example, 
dated commodities, such as old-fashioned typewriters or ‘tin cars’ of poor 
quality. Therefore, Middle-Eastern Muslim countries were sought to provide 
markets for Turkey’s exports. In an attempt to approach these countries, 
Kenan Evren, the Chief General of the 1980 junta, managed to become the 
‘honoured guest’ of the Islam World Conference convened in 1983. Following 
more diplomatic manoeuvres, the Middle East became a major destination for 
exports.109 Cosy relations with Muslim countries brought about concessions to 
pro-Islamic segments in Turkey. The army, for example, converted all elective 
modules of ‘comparative ethics and religion’ in schools to compulsory by-heart 
readings of Koranic Verses. Religious Imam Schools also mushroomed. 
Whilst cutting expenditure on education in order to comply with IMF 
prescriptions, the government allowed Saudi charities to fund clergy 
schools.110 Further concessions were accorded to ‘Islamic companies’ 
through tax exemptions ‘to compensate for their interest-free trade’ ordained 
by Islam. 
The ‘politicisation of religion’ in the parliamentary setting has accompanied the 
unfolding of ‘Islamic companies’. Even though the pro-Islamic National 
Salvation Party had gained no more than 8 per cent of votes in the 1960s and 
1970s, it was banned after the 1980 military coup like other parties.111 Yet its 
cadres were permitted in 1983 to come to office within the army-blessed MLP 
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in order to implement neo-liberal policies. As the conventional representatives 
of ‘shopkeepers’, they commenced internationalising small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the neo-liberal era. Islamic groups appealed to Turkish 
‘guest workers’ in Germany who had hitherto been frustrated by the military at 
the beginning of the 1980s. When the army freed interest rates in 1981 for 
capital accumulation, workers outside the country invested remittances with 
Turkish Bankers. Yet the military provided no legislative buffer for small 
savers when bankers collapsed due to high interest rates in 1983.112 Then, 
the religious decency rhetoric of Islamic groups became a new hope for these 
investors and they supplied much of the financial capital to the so-called 
‘Anatolian Tigers’, whose share rose to one-quarter of total exports in 1997, 
particularly by successful gambits in textiles.113 
Benefiting from the economic power of SMEs, Islamic groups gained electoral 
momentum. Before the 1987 elections, they defected from the MLP to the 
Refah (Welfare) Party and a decade later in 1997 joined the government as 
the major coalition partner, garnering one-fifth of votes. The Refah 
administration paid one of its first international visits to Capitol Hill as ‘proof’ of 
its goodwill toward the USA.114 This move was no surprise given that the petty 
bourgeoisie sponsors of the Islamic Party, SMEs, relied heavily on 
international credit agencies. Once the Refah Party took office, pro-Islamic 
policy makers started to prioritise members of MUSIAD, the association for 
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the SMEs of Anatolia, in dispensing IMF loans.115 The favouring of SMEs was 
an apparent frustration for members of TUSIAD, representing the large 
businesses of Istanbul, which subsequently conducted a campaign in the 
media against ‘the coming of sharia’, the Islamic Order. The army thwarted 
this, partly because the redistribution of resources was by no means 
‘irrational’, but helpful for the accumulation of neo-liberal capital as far as the 
State Planning Organisation was concerned.116 The generals also thought 
that keeping the Refah Party in office would undermine its popularity as had 
happened to other parties since they could not deliver electoral pledges to 
voters due to budgetary constraints.117 
However, in the following several months of administration, Refah advisers 
proved to be cleverer and bolder than the army had assumed, designing 
policies in order to tackle fiscal shortfalls. Most notably, the Refah Party 
permitted waived imports to citizens living abroad for a special fee, hoping to 
obtain millions of dollars. Unlike the other parties, the Refah Party was 
determined to augment its popularity in office and this was not good news for 
the ‘secular ideology’ of the army in the long-term. In particular, waived car 
imports posed an immediate threat to the economic interests of the military by 
jeopardising the exorbitant profits of the army’s OYAK car company in 
domestic markets, a joint venture with the French Renault.118 Alarmed by 
such developments, the army in 1998 coerced the government to step down, 
using the threat of force. After the dismantling of the government, the Islamic 
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Refah Party was closed down by the State Security Court. The army also 
‘named and shamed’ many SMEs sponsoring the Islamic party and removed 
their no-tax privileges. This induced the crumbling of the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ at 
the height of the ‘Asian crisis’; half of the textile companies had subsequently 
passed to foreign investors by 2001.119 
Secular intellectuals expressed support for the ‘war on the Refah Party’. 
Ignoring the army’s role in the rise of the Islamic tide, the elite hurled 
democratic values overboard and lined up behind the military. Most 
intellectuals argued that ‘soft strategies’ against Islamists would engender 
sharia as had happened in Iran.120 This defensiveness also echoed the elite’s 
concern over its economic dividends that were being hampered by Islamic 
competitors in a varied range of activities from the media to fashion industries 
and high-ranking jobs in the bureaucracy.121 In the face of Islamist threats, the 
Alevi, the largest of the religious minorities, also gave their support to the 
army. Comprising roughly 15 per cent of the population, the Alevi traditionally 
practise a secular teaching within the Anatolian hermeneutics of Islam and 
their political consciousness is historically informed by fundamentalist 
massacres against them. In July 1993, for example, at an Alevi cultural 
festival in Sivas, fundamentalist mobs set fire to a hotel where many Alevi 
participants had taken refuge. The police’s failure to interfere resulted in the 
killing of dozens of Alevis. The dignitaries of mostly poor Alevi communities 
keep presenting gifts to the army generals, a pitiful tribute to elicit their 
                                                                                                                                         
118 J. Barham, ‘Leaving Protectionism Behind’, Financial Times, 1998, December 6. 
119 Turkish Treasury, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov.tr/english/ybs/ybsyeniing.htm 
120 Ilhan Selcuk, ‘Uygarlik Kanla Gelir’, 1998, Cumhuriyet, February 29. 
 37
support and protection.122 The broader sections of the poor, however, 
remained loyal to ‘pro-Islamic’ politicians, and in doing so, sustained the rise 
of a new pro-Islamic party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). 
Electoral support for pro-Islamic politics in general does not simply stem from 
religious propaganda. It feeds on the needs of the poor and their hostility to 
corrupt government.123 After losing their confidence in corrupt mainstream 
parties, poor shantytown dwellers have become a bastion of pro-Islamic 
parties.124 Endemic economic crises have also consolidated this situation as a 
result of escalating poverty. In pursuit of dragging Turkey into US-led military 
action in Afghanistan ‘in retaliation for September 11’, the IMF bailed out the 
Turkish economy in 2001 from default with a $16bn stand-by agreement.125 
The cost of economic turbulence to the poor, however, became most evident; 
in 2002, one in six people was reported to live in danger of starvation that had 
been eradicated for decades after the Second World War.126 In that year, the 
pro-Islamic JDP garnered one-third of votes in elections and gained almost 
two-thirds of seats since other parties had failed to pass the ten-per cent 
threshold, except for the RPP of the ‘centre left’, mostly supported by Alevi 
communities.127 To counter such outcomes, the military had already accused 
the leader of the JDP, Tayip Erdogan, of promoting ‘religious hatred’ and the 
State Security Court had prohibited him in 2000 from participation in politics. 
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After the elections, the establishment used the ban on Mr. Erdogan to make a 
political deal with the pro-Islamic government. 
At the end of long negotiations ‘mediated’ by the columnists of the main 
dailies, the army agreed not to deploy the Supreme Court to cancel 
constitutional changes designed by the JDP to enable the pro-Islamic leader 
to stand in the first by-elections. For this, however, the party officially declared 
‘a full-commitment to secular principles like the Christian Democrats in 
Europe’.128 Such a move irritated radical cadres at the core of the party, but 
they could not resist what was on offer. Erdogan assured his aides that after 
taking the premiership, he would find a way to refuse the JDP’s election 
promise to scrap the legal immunity of MPs indicted in over 30 corruption 
cases against pro-Islamic deputies.129 This was not only a relief to JDP cadres 
but also to the army since corruption trials always raise public doubts about 
the integrity of generals involved in such scandals. The JDP’s abandonment 
of anti-corruption pledges was by no means a smaller blow to its mostly poor 
electoral supporters than compromising with ‘secular benchmarks’, but they 
were to be let down further. To retrieve the electoral prerogatives of their 
leader, the party’s high command dropped another election promise regarding 
a job creation programme that would be funded through curbing military 
expenditure and renegotiating IMF terms to advance ‘social programmes’.130 
Thus, the ‘anti-Islamic’ policies of the army became a new front against the 
egalitarian demands of impoverished populations. The final part will argue that 
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it is not possible to solve the socio-economic and political problems discussed 
so far without a mature opposition to institutional oppression. 
Can Democracy Win Against Institutional Oppression? 
In recent years, protectionist threats to neo-liberalism have been in decline 
since the government has provided financial assistance to protection leaning 
large companies in order to shift their businesses to exports.131 As 
protectionist propensities among business circles abate, businessmen 
become more united against the political elite for greater power. In 2002, 
TUSIAD argued that ‘corrupt politicians should be got rid of if the democracy 
is to be lifted to the EU standards’.132 It has also started to complain about 
unfair competition from the army’s OYAK Company due to its no-tax 
privileges. Such attempts are backed by SMEs as well. In particular, they 
hope to avoid the previously mentioned ‘military retribution for harbouring 
Islamic menaces in Turkey’.133 However, the ‘democracy campaign’ of 
businessmen against the political elite is handicapped by their growing 
dependency on oppressive practices toward the working class. 
The lambasting of corrupt politicians by businessmen was largely a ‘twisted' 
reaction to the failure of the government to deliver its capital tax-reduction 
promise at the expense of the poor and the economic foundation of 
democracy. The government’s plans were prevented by the IMF in order to 
raise capital taxes as a way of funding Turkey’s debt payments -which peaked 
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at three quarters of GDP when the economy was near-default in 2001.134 In 
fact, employers’ contributions to social security and corporate taxes were so 
low – 5 per cent of GDP in 2001, half below the EU average - that they 
escalated an ‘effective demand shortage’ along with poverty.135 Businesses 
tend to avoid difficulties with stringent domestic markets by shifting to an 
outward orientation through not only exports but also overseas investments 
that amounted to $10bn in 2001.136 To reduce capital taxes at home, 
capitalists urged the military to use its influence on the government by 
complaining about OYAK’s no-tax privileges. Yet the difficulty with this 
strategy was that the OYAK-supported strength of the army was vital for 
business circles to maintain social stability if capital taxes were reduced.137  
Ignoring the anti-corruption rhetoric of pro-Islamic JDP, Tayyip Erdogan, who 
became Prime Minister after the by-elections in April 2003, has outlawed legal 
inspections into the unscrupulous sales of state companies.138 Instead, he 
introduced a new labour law that envisaged diminishing job security for 
thousands of employees, especially in SMEs.139 Despite its electoral pledges, 
the pro-Islamic government also continues to forge ahead with the 
construction of the new Ilusu dam in the Southeast to promote agricultural 
exports. The dam has already driven Kurds away from several villages, left an 
ancient Kurdish town, Hasan Keyf, under water, and could contribute to 
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‘water-wars’ in the Middle East. The Ilusu dam, along with other dams, 
creates water-shortages in neighbouring Syria, provoking it to shelter Kurdish 
paramilitaries in the Bekaa Valley. Defying the listing of the PKK among 
‘terrorist organisations’ by the USA and EU after September 11, the Kurdish 
opposition groups launched a new organisation, the KADEK. In an attempt to 
soothe the Kurds, Brussels has specified that averting Turkey’s ultimate 
exclusion from the EU’s expansion depends on an urgent abolition of the ban 
on the Kurdish language and the death penalty on political prisoners, 
including Abdullah Ocalan.140 In the public domain, the army opposed the 
exclusion prospect as an ‘unfair treatment of the centuries-long struggle of the 
nation to become Westernised’, yet it also kept sending threatening letters to 
columnist who supported ‘pro-Kurdish reforms at the cost of national unity’.141 
Because the Bush administration has pragmatically tied some IMF loans to 
the ‘urgent bills’ to maintain Turkey ‘on a pro-Western track’, the reform 
package has been legislated but it has failed to address poverty and 
oppression at large.142 
Although poverty and oppression have constituted a growing barrier to 
Turkey’s accession to the EU since the initiation of pro-market policies, 
Brussels avoids releasing designated funds to initiate sustainable economic 
policies in Turkey along with other candidates.143 Favouring cheap imports 
from Turkey in particular, Brussels avoids trade sanctions against the 
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military’s companies, although the army breaches ILO conventions by using 
the forced labour of conscripted soldiers.144 Nor do EU governments refrain 
from issuing trade licences for arms exports to Turkey, despite international 
denouncements on moral grounds.145 The army’s superiority to the law is also 
occasionally ratified by the European Human Rights Court in an attempt to 
help the military keep itself ‘clean’ from Islamic currents. The court arbitrarily 
turns down complaints about the legal unaccountability of the military in firing, 
or coercing into early retirement, ‘untrustworthy’ army officers. Such 
dismissals play a key role in the perpetuation of institutional oppression, not 
only by rooting out ‘anti-secular’ officers but also any sort of intra-military 
faction against corrupt and hawkish propensities within the army as one of the 
greatest fears of generals.146 Moreover, in order to secure political stability in 
Turkey’s emerging market economy, and the army’s co-operation in the ‘war 
on terror’, the American and British governments publicly purport that the 
Turkish army is not an obstacle but a guarantor of the ‘democracy role-model’ 
in the region.147 This, however, showed how deeply the attitudes toward 
Turkey’s future are split among the Western countries, and how dangerously 
the fascistic inclinations are close to the surface in Turkey. 
When the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 declined to give a firm 
date for the start of accession talks with Turkey, it made specific references to 
the heavy influence of the military in civil politics. In particular, opposition 
groups within the EU tried to devise an associate membership status for 
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Turkey, together with Russia and the Ukraine, as a way of keeping the 
country at arms length.148 Such attempts encouraged fascistic leanings within 
the establishment. The military initiated an intense political campaign for a 
puppet Turkmen state in Northern Iraq, heralding it as ‘the only way to prevent 
the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq and escalated Kurdish 
separatism in Turkey’.149 The army’s mouthpieces in the media had no 
qualms in citing ‘the historical rights of the Ottoman Empire’ in the oil reserves 
of Kirkuk.150 Fortunately, three-quarters of the public opposed aggressive 
policies, fearing the economic and humanitarian costs of the war.151 In the 
face of public pressure, one-third of pro-Islamic MPs also lined up with the 
opposition party and rejected America’s plans to use Turkish military bases to 
attack Iraq.152 However, the TUSIAD and MUSIAD urged the pro-Islamic party 
to open Turkish airspace to the USA, hoping to obtain credits from IMF in 
addition to dividends from the Iraqi oil reserves.153 Ironically, some pro-
European intellectuals also supported hawkish generals after the 
Copenhagen Summit. They maintained that the participation of the military in 
the invasion of Iraq could be a strong leverage to push the EU to revise its 
position towards the country.154 
However, the lining up of the various sections of the elite and the public 
behind the army in the face of civil war, far right currents, corruption or Islamic 
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tides has so far proven to be a debacle and consolidated oppression. 
Corroborative attachments have also led to an increasing proportion of the 
poor having to bear the brunt of neo-liberal economic policies. Inequality has 
reached such a level that it requires even greater courage on the part of 
intellectuals to criticise it on a class-basis, since they may well join the ranks 
of the growing poor following likely dismissal, if not imprisonment. Defeatism, 
on the other hand, endangers most unaffordable outcomes for the people of 
the country. They are in danger of becoming either human-shield for 
imperialist aggressions in the region or victims of the expansionist adventures 
of far right currents in the ultimate stage of full-scale fascism. The conducting 
of international and domestic affairs in peaceful and sustainable ways can 
only be ensured by democratic control over political institutions.  
Pro-democracy reforms required by the EU for accession talks with candidate 
countries may not secure an end to Brussels’ reservations on Turkey’s 
accession to the club in short term. Ongoing accession talks with Turkey are 
expected to take at least a decade. Even so, further reforms would help 
promote both public scrutiny of relations with the EU and a concrete ground 
for wider democratic campaigns to challenge institutional oppression in 
general.’ The pro-Islamic government has already removed some executive 
powers of the NSC by taking the opportunity of ‘accession reforms. The 
legitimacy of the actions top generals has also begun to be questioned 
publicly. Indeed, a juridical report compiled in March 2006 accused the 
present chief of the staff, Yasar Buyukanit of the military abuse and 
provocation of the Kurds. The incident, added by the following dismissal of the 
prosecutor because of the army’s pressure, caused a widespread public 
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scepticism. Although the military continuously condemns ‘fundamentalist 
plotters’, a growing number of civilian secularists have begun to appreciate 
that the oppressive nature of the regime obstructs democratic alternatives to 
the popularity of ‘pro-Islamic’ politicians. Considering all these, a well-
balanced conclusion would require putting the emphasis on the paradoxical 
rise of both challenges to, and opportunities for, combating institutional 
oppression in Turkey. 
